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THE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE: ABSOLUTE MEANS ABSOLUTE
NIGEL S. RODLEY*
1. INTRODUCTION
Our values as a Nation, values that we share with many nations in
the world, call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who
are not legally entitled to such treatment .... As a matter of policy, the
United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely
These seemingly encouraging words, purporting to reaffirm the best humane
traditions of the United States and other nations, are in fact, a high-profile
representation of a serious and sustained assault on basic legal values previously
asserted by the United States and many other nations. For the words unmistakably
assert a legal right not to treat at least some detainees humanely. If that is so for
the United States, it is also the case for other nations, whether or not they share the
United States' values as a nation.
The statement was made on the basis of legal opinions emanating from, and
signed by, political appointees in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC), opinions at least partly contested by the Department of State's
Legal Adviser's office.2 Several subsequent opinions from the OLC continued the
legal construct that was calculated to allow the military and/or the Central
* Sir Nigel. Rodley, Professor of Law, University of Essex, United Kingdom; former United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Torture. This paper is based on an address commissioned by the Urban Morgan
Institute of Human Rights entitled 'Torture in the 21st Century: the Practice and the Law,' with
subsequent versions delivered at the University of Denver and the annual meeting of the American
Society of International Law. See generally Nigel S. Rodley, William J. Butler Lecture on International
Law at the University of Cincinnati: Torture in the 21st Century - The Practice and the Law (Sept. 23,
2004); Nigel S. Rodley, Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture at the University of Denver: The
Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Why It Should Stay That Way (Mar. 10, 2005); Nigel S. Rodley,
Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 2, 2005); ASIL
Proceedings, 2005, 402-06.
1. Memorandum from President Bush to Vice President Cheney (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in
MARK DANNER. TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 106 (2004)
[hereinafter DANNER].
2. See Memorandum from Alberto Gonzales to President Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in
DANNER, supra note 1, at 83; Memorandum from William H. Taft IV to Albert Gonzales (Feb. 2, 2002),
reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at 94; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R. Gonzales
(Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at 96. The Secretary of State and the Attorney
General were themselves part of the correspondence. Memorandum from Colin Powell to Alberto
Gonzales (Jan. 26, 2002), DANNER, supra note 1, at 88; Letter from John Ashcroft to President Bush
(Feb. 1, 2002), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at 92. Note, the memoranda in question are also
reproduced in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter TORTURE PAPERS].
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Intelligence Agency (CIA), or similar bodies, to take off the proverbial gloves.
3
The most notorious of these was an OLC memorandum of August 1 2002,
specifically dealing with interrogation practices (2002 Interrogation
Memorandum).4 They were supplemented by a 2003 Department of Defense
(DoD) Working Group Report, also apparently finalized by politically appointed
lawyers over the strenuous objections of the career lawyers, notably in the various
Judge Advocate General's offices.5  There was a partial attempt to undo the
damage created by the 2002 Interrogation Memorandum; it was replaced by a
December 30, 2004 memorandum (2004 Interrogation Memorandum).
6 It is not
clear how valid the DoD Working Group Report remains now that its chief legal
inspiration has been withdrawn.
7
In this paper, I shall set out the legal arguments according to which humane
treatment of all detainees is indisputably required by international law, both
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and international
human rights law.8 In the process, I shall seek to refute what I take to be the key
arguments raised by the U.S. government's lawyers. These arguments will
apparently follow a strategy, according to which, either the relevant treaty does not
apply to these detainees, or the practices at issue do not constitute torture.
I must make two preambular points. Unlike some, I do not view the atrocities
of September 11, 2001 as just another set of terrorist acts of the sort much of the
world has had to endure in recent decades. The images and reality behind them
will haunt us for decades, maybe centuries. They are the stuff of evil. The scale of
the attacks, their enormity, places them on a substantially different scale from prior
situations characterized by terrorism. Yes, other societies may have lost more
people in facing ruthless terrorist enemies-internal or external-over a protracted
period, but precisely the fact that the perpetrators of 9/11 could destroy in a single
3. Mark Danner quotes an email from an unnamed captain in Military Intelligence: "The gloves
are coming off gentlemen regarding these detainees, Col. Boltz has made it clear that we want these
individuals broken." DANNER, supra note 1, at 33.
4. See generally Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto Gonzales (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted
in DANNER, supra note 1, at 115 [hereinafter 2002 Interrogation Memorandum].
5. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS (Apr. 2, 2003), reprinted in TORTURE PAPERS supra note 2, at 286; 151 CONG. REC.
S8772, S8794-96 (daily ed. July 25, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham), available at
www.humanrightsfirst.org/uslaw/etn/pdf/jag-memos-072505.pdf (noting the OLC opinion does not
incorporate concern for military service members).
6. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin to James B. Comey (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/l8usc23402340a2.htm [hereinafter 2004 Interrogation Memorandum].
7. It is reported that the Department of Defense is revising its army field manual in respect of
interrogation methods. See Eric Schmitt, Army, In Manual, Limiting Tactics In Interrogation, N.Y.
TIMES, April 28, 2005, at A4.
8. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.
1231, 1235 (2005); Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity: Intelligence, Interrogation
and Torture 6 (Case Western Reserve University Research Paper Series in Legal Studies Working
Paper 05-13, July 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-758444.
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hour lives and property that other terrorist movements have taken years to destroy
makes them an enemy requiring maximum resistance, provided that the resistance
is within the law.
My second preambular point relates to the interrogation practices that have
been the subject of national and international concern. It would not be appropriate
for me, as a member of the Human Rights Committee established under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to address contested matters
of fact. Nor is it necessary to my purpose, which is to elucidate the relevant legal
norms. So I shall not comment on how aberrant or otherwise were the scandalous
violations of Abu Ghraib, in respect of which some courts martial have taken
place. 9  But a number of hitherto unauthorized techniques approved by the
Secretary of Defense for possible use by interrogators would be capable of
constituting torture and/or cruel or inhuman treatment, namely:
* Hooding
* Sleep adjustment (e.g., reversing sleep cycles from day to night. We
are told 'this technique is not sleep deprivation)
* False flag (convincing the detainee that individuals from a country
other than the United States are interrogating him)
* Threat of transfer (threatening to transfer the subject to a third
country that subject is likely to fear would subject him to torture or
death. The threat would not be acted upon, nor would the threat
include any information beyond the naming of the receiving country)
* Isolation for up to 30 days
* Forced grooming (consider the effect of forced shaving on a devout
Muslim)
* Use of stress positions such as prolonged standing (up to 4/24 hours)
" Sleep deprivation
" Removal of clothing
* Increasing anxiety by the use of aversions e.g. presence of dogs
* Deprivation of light/auditory stimuli (i.e., sensory deprivation
techniques)'
9. Albeit only of those at the lowest level, caught on camera. The extent of the practices has
been documented in three official reports: MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6
INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (2004), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1,
at 290-96; LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTHONY R. JONES, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB
DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 4-6 (2004), reprinted in DANNER,
supra note 1, at 412-14; MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE R. FAY, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU
GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE 68-137 (2004), reprinted
in DANNER, supra note 1, at 504-73; FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DETENTION OPERATIONS (2004), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at
363-73 [hereinafter SCHLESINGER REPORT].
10. See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 9, at app. E, reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at 393
(providing a list of approved interrogation techniques).
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I refer to these as they must be presumed to be illustrative of the kinds of
interrogation techniques that the authors of the legal memoranda were concerned
should pass legal muster. Any combination of them, especially over a protracted
period of time would certainly 'amount to' torture. Many of these techniques have
been used at Guantdnamo. The sin apparently committed at Abu Ghraib is that
they were used without the appropriate safeguards (and on camera?). It was not
done by the book, even if it was contemplated by the book. And it is a book
approved by people with legal credentials. I am not aware of the case for the
following not to constitute torture or cruel or inhuman treatment: Seizing and
transferring people to the other side of the world for months or years without end;'
holding them isolated from the outside world, sometimes hidden from the ICRC
("ghost detainees"); "extraordinary renditions" to countries where the rendered
person faces torture. That case would make for interesting reading.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
To start with international humanitarian law, since that is where the
Presidential Directive starts, it always seemed reasonably straightforward. As far
as international armed conflict is concerned, several provisions of each of the
Geneva Conventions demand humane treatment. For example, the Third Geneva
Convention on the Protection of Prisoners of War provides in article 17:
No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may
be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any
kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be
threatened, insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous
treatment of any kind.12
Similarly, the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian
Persons stipulates in article 32:
11. One OLC memorandum argues that the United States:
[M]ay, consistent with article 49 [of the Fourth Geneva Convention], (1) remove
"protected persons" who are illegal aliens from Iraq pursuant to local
immigration law; and (2) relocate "protected persons" (whether illegal aliens or
not) from Iraq to another country to facilitate interrogation, for a brief but not
indefinite period, so long as adjudicative proceedings have not been initiated
against them.
Memorandum from Jack I. Goldsmith III to Alberto Gonzales (Mar. 19, 2004), reprinted in TORTURE
PAPERS, supra note 2, at 367-68. Article 49, first paragraph, states that "[i]ndividual or mass forcible
transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their
motive." Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 49,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Convention]. The reader is invited
to consult the memorandum to discover by what juridical alchemy its author can assert that even
protected persons who are not illegal aliens may be removed, albeit "for a brief, but not indefinite
period." Memorandum from Jack t. Goldsmith III to Alberto Gonzales, (Mar. 19, 2004), reprinted in
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 2, at 368.
12. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 17, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Convention].
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The High Contracting Parties specifically agree that each of them
is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the
physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands.
This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal
punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experiments not
necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to
any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military
agents.13
Indeed, all the Geneva Conventions consider as grave breaches "torture or
inhuman treatment" and "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health."' 14  Grave breaches are a species of war crime. They are subject to
jurisdiction by any state party "regardless of their nationality."'
' 5
Meanwhile, Article 3 common to all the Geneva Conventions, which applies
in non-international armed conflict, requires that "[p]ersons taking no active part
in hostilities, including... those placed hors de combat by ... detention ... shall
in all circumstances be treated humanely"' 6 Among certain acts "prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever" are "violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture" as well as "outrages on
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment."' 7 Violations
of these provisions have been considered war crimes by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.' 8 They are so considered by article 8 of the
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).19 It is worth noting that the only
legislative definition in international humanitarian law of terms such as "torture"
and "cruel or inhuman treatment" are to be found in the Elements of Crime agreed
by signatories to the ICC, including the United States.20  Thus both "inhuman"
(international armed conflict) and "cruel" (non-international conflict) are defined
as the infliction of "severe physical or mental pain or suffering." 21 There is no
13. Fourth Convention, supra note 11, art. 32. See also, Fourth Convention arts. 27, 31, 37, 118,
119; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Second Convention] art. 12; Third Convention, supra note 12, arts. 13, 14, 87, 89, 99.
14. First Convention, supra note 13, art. 50; Second Convention, supra note 13, art. 51; Third
Convention, supra note 12, art. 130; Fourth Convention, supra note 12, art. 147.
15. First Convention, supra note 13 art. 49; Second Convention, supra note 13, art. 50; Third
Convention, supra note 12, art. 129; Fourth Convention, supra note 11, art. 146.
16. See, e.g., First Convention, supra note 13, art. 3.
17. Id.
18. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case no. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 134 (Oct. 2, 1995).
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
20. See Elements of Crimes, Int'l Crim. Ct. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 at 126 (Sept. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/Istsession/report/english/part-ii-b-e.pdf [hereinafter Elements of
Crimes].
21. Pursuant to article 9 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, signatory states met to formulate the
crimes contemplated by the Statute in precise terms in a document entitled "Elements of Crime." See id.
As a participant in the Rome Conference the United States participated in the Preparatory Commission
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distinction between them. The only element that distinguishes each of these from
torture is that torture has the additional element of purpose: the pain or suffering
must be inflicted "for a purpose such as obtaining information or a confession,
punishment, intimidation or coercion, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind.",
22
What then could possibly be the basis for denying the legal obligation of
humane treatment? The strategy is to argue that the treaties do not apply. The
OLC has asserted that the war in Afghanistan (and presumably by extension the
war against Al-Qaeda) was an international armed conflict.23 So, according to the
argument, first, the benefits of the guarantees were vouchsafed only to "protected
persons. 24  The Taliban are not covered as protected persons because they are
apparently "unlawful combatants" (a category unknown to the Conventions) and
Al-Qaeda are not covered because they were unlawful combatants and they do not
belong to a contracting party (i.e. a state) that is also a party to the conflict.
25
Second, the protection of common article 3 which would cover anyone in the
hands of any party to a non-international armed conflict, do not apply because it is
an international armed conflict.26
This view that Professor Wedgwood and James Woolsey have described as
"captious ' ' 2 7 may come as a surprise to anyone brought up on the observation about
common article 3 in the great commentary on the Geneva Conventions compiled
by Jean Pictet: "Representing, as it does, the minimum which must be applied in
the least determinate of conflicts, its terms must afortiori be respected in the case
of international conflicts proper, when all the provisions of the Convention are
applicable.,
28
Nevertheless, let us allow, for the purposes of argument, that the guarantee
articulated in common article 3, although applicable to anyone in the hands of a
party to a non-international conflict, does not apply to such a person in
international armed conflict if they are not "protected persons." There is still the
little matter of customary or general international law.
that drafted the text that was adopted by the Assembly of States Parties. See id. at arts. 8(2)(a)(ii)-2
(international armed conflict) and 8(2)(c)(i)-3 (non-international armed conflict).
22. See id. at art. 8(2)(c)(i)-4.
23. See Memorandum from John Yoo to William J. Haynes 11 at 1-2, 7, 10 (Jan. 9, 2002),
available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 127/02.01.09.pdf.
24. See Fourth Convention, supra note I1, art. 4.
25. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto Gonzales at 9-11 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf. For the ICRC and many
others, the Taliban, if not prisoners of war, must be protected civilians. There is no third category. Of
course, persons in either category may be tried for criminal activity.
26. id. at 10.
27. Ruth Wedgwood & R. James Woolsey, Law and Torture, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2004, at A10.
28. JEAN PICTET, GENEVA CONVENTION (Ill) RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF
WAR, COMMENTARY, at 38 (1960), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/375-
590006?OpenDocument (emphasis added).
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In a long-awaited, recently published study, the International Committee of
the Red Cross includes the following rule of customary international humanitarian
law: "Rule 90: Torture, cruel or inhuman treatment and outrages on personal
dignity, in particular humiliation and degrading treatment, are prohibited.,
29
One of the sources cited for the proposition is Article 75 of Additional
Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions.30 That article closes the "gap," if
there ever was one. It covers "persons who are in the power of a Party to the
conflict and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the
[Geneva] Conventions . ,31 Such persons are to be "treated humanely in all
circumstances ....32 The article goes on to prohibit "torture of all kinds, whether
physical or mental," "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment ... and any form of indecent assault," as well as "threats to
commit any of the foregoing acts."33 Since the United States is not a party to the
Protocol, for reasons having nothing to do with article 75, it is not bound by it as a
matter of treaty obligation. However, like common Article 3, which the World
Court has already considered as articulating "fundamental general principles of
humanitarian law" and "a minimum yardstick" even for international conflicts,
34
Article 75 is generally considered as on par with common article 3. Indeed, the
United States Army Judge Advocate General's own Operational Law Handbook
(2003) has taken the view that Article 75 is one of a large number of articles that
are "either legally binding as customary international law or acceptable practice
though not legally binding."35 It cites an article by the Department of State's
Michael Matheson that includes Article 75 among a number of provisions that are
already, or should be recognized as binding.
36
The OLC memorandum has the following to say about the customary
international law dimension:
29. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW VOLUME 1 at 315 (Jean-
Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
30. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3. The 1949 Geneva Conventions were supplemented by two Additional Protocols adopted in
1977 by Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflict; Additional Protocol I applies to international armed conflict, while




34. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-14.
35. COL. TIA JOHNSON, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 11 (2003), available at
https://www.jagcnet.army.mil.
36. Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International
Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM.U. INT'L L. REv. 419,
420 (1987); See also Department of Defense Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, Chief, Int'l Law
Branch, DAJA-IA, Lt. Commander Michael F. Lohr, JAGC, USN, Lt. Col. Dennis Yodek, USAF-
AF/JACI, and William Anderson (USMC/JAR) to John J. McNeill, Assistant General Counsel
(International), OSD (May 8, 1986) (on file with author). This document states the joint view of the
legal branches of the four armed services that certain provisions of Protocol I, including Article 75, "are
already part of customary international law."
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Some may take the view that even if the Geneva Conventions, by
their terms, do not govern the treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban
prisoners, the substance of these agreements has received such universal
approval that it has risen to the status of customary international law.
Customary international law, however, cannot bind the executive branch
under the Constitution, because it is not federal law.
37
There is nothing more. But there one can probably see, leaping out of the bag
with a grin as wide as it is long, the cat. For the relevant federal law is the War
Crimes Act which incorporates, not customary international law, but the Geneva
Conventions. 38 If the Geneva Conventions fail to protect the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda detainees, then those who ill-treat them will not be committing offences
under the War Crimes Act. The fact that the victims are entitled to protection
under customary international law is of no concern, any more than is the fact that
the perpetrators may be committing war crimes under customary international
law.39 What a far cry this is from the humane vision of ICRC member Daniel
Thilrer, for whom international humanitarian law could be seen as the basis of a
constitutional system of public international law.4 °
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states simply, "[n]o
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." 1 The prohibition is found in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,42 the American Convention on Human Rights,43 and the European
Convention on Human Rights.44 None of the pertinent provisions can be derogated
from, even in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation.45 It is also prohibited by article 5 of the African Charter on Human and
People's Rights, which has no derogation provision.46 It is the practice of the
37. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 25, at 32.
38. War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996).
39. Tadi6, supra note 18, paras. 128-137.
40. Thuerer, 'International Humanitarian Law as a Core of a "Constitutional System" of Public
International Law?', in: Stefania Baldini/Guido Ravasi (eds.), Humanitarian Action and State
Sovereignty International - Congress on the Occasion of its XXXth Anniversary, San Remo 31 August -
2 September 2000, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Milano 2003, p. 4 6 -5 8 .
41. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5., G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71
(1948).
42. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
43. American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
44. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (note the word "cruel" is absent) [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights].
45. General human rights treaties allow States Parties to suspend or derogate from some of their
provisions, when confronted by a state of emergency such as internal or external conflict, but some of
their provisions are insulated from being so suspended. See ICCPR, supra note 42, art. 4; European
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 44, art. 15; American Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 43, art. 27.
46. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 5, June 27, 1981,21 I.L.M. 58.
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bodies set up under the treaties (the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR
and the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights) to consider that
states parties are obliged to investigate allegations of torture and the graver forms
of other prohibited ill-treatment with a view to prosecuting the perpetrators. 7 All
victims of a violation of the pertinent provision are expected to be compensated.
48
Moreover, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk
of any violation of the prohibition, no one should be sent to a country where they
would be exposed to that risk.49 The difficult problem with the treaties is that, like
the Geneva Conventions, they do not offer a definition of torture or other forms of
prohibited ill-treatment. I shall return to this point.
In addition, there are the United Nations (UN) Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. I shall focus on the UN
Convention since, although the Inter-American Convention is generally more
embracing in its protection, especially in its definition of torture, the UN
Convention may, at present, be a better guide to the relevant general international
law; and it has also been ratified by the United States.
CAT, having defined torture (see below), makes it clear that "[n]o exceptional
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture. '5 ° It rules out the defense of obedience to superior orders.
51
It establishes criminal responsibility by requiring criminalization, not only of the
infliction of the torture, but also the instigation of, consenting to or acquiescence in
52 .53torture, as well as complicity or participation in torture. It requires submission
of the case for prosecution, or extradition to another country having jurisdiction, of
any person present in the territory against whom there is information that the
person has committed torture (i.e., (quasi)-universal jurisdiction).54 It requires
redress and compensation for victims55 and incorporates the common law idea of
inadmissibility in legal proceedings of statements made under torture.56  It
prohibits the sending of a person to a country in which there are substantial
grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.57 It also requires states to prevent "other acts of cruel, inhuman or
47. See NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-112
(2nd ed. 1999).
48. Id. at 114-115.
49. Id. at 116-120.
50. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 2, para. 2, U.N. Doc A/39/51, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (June 26, 1987) [hereinafter
CAT].
51. Id. at art. 2, para. 3.
52. Id. at art. 1.
53. Id. at art. 4.
54. Id. at arts. 4-7.
55. Id. at art. 14.
56. Id. at art. 15.
57. Id. at art. 3.
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degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture."58 This, "in
particular," means that certain provisions of the Convention apply both to torture
and to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. These do not include
the provisions I have referred to. Those embraced are the obligation to train
relevant personnel,59 the obligation to keep interrogation practices under review
"with a view to preventing any cases of torture" 60 and the obligation to investigate
not only specific allegations of torture61 but also ex officio whenever there is
reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has occurred.62 However, the
failure to include other provisions does not necessarily mean that the principles
contained in the other provisions cannot apply to ill-treatment not amounting to
torture, for the provisions of the Convention are expressly "without prejudice to
the provisions of any other international instrument or national law which prohibits
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.,
63
How, then, does the OLC instruct us on these matters? It focuses on the CAT
rather than the ICCPR, which was totally ignored in the withdrawn 2002
Interrogation Memorandum and has graduated to a "see also" reference in a
footnote to the 2004 Interrogation Memorandum. 64  Having in the 2002
Interrogation Memorandum asserted a number of ways of avoiding responsibility
for torture-the President's Commander-in-Chief powers and claimed defenses of
necessity and self-defense-the 2004 Interrogation Memorandum refrains from
addressing these on the grounds that they are "unnecessary" in the light of "the
President's unequivocal directive that U.S. personnel not engage in torture.,,65 I
have difficulty following how the President's policy makes understanding of the
legal responsibility of U.S. personnel involved in interrogations unnecessary. But,
since this is the official position now, I shall refrain from dealing with these
disturbing doctrines, doctrines that have not been retracted and were evidently
approved, if not encouraged, by the present Attorney General of the United
States.66
What is common to both of the OLC memoranda is the central reliance on a
theory according to which torture is at the top end of a pyramid of pain or
suffering. This theory is based on the practice of the organs of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
The locus classicus is the case of Ireland v. UK, in which the European Court
of Human Rights found five interrogation techniques used in 1972 by the British
security forces against IRA suspects to be inhuman and degrading, but not
58. Id. at art. 16, para, 1.
59. Id. at art. 10.
60. Id. at art. 11.
61. Id. at art. 13.
62. Id. at art. 12.
63. Id. at art. 16, para. 2.
64. 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1.
65. Id. at 2.
66. David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Bush 's Counsel Sought Ruling on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
5, 2005, at AI.
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torture. 67 The five techniques were: hooding, wall-standing, deprivation of food
and drink, deprivation of sleep and subjection to loud noise, in combination, but
for less than 24 hours.68 According to the Court, these practices did not deserve
the "special stigma" of torture.69  It invoked the recently adopted 1975 UN
Declaration against Torture, according to which torture constituted "an aggravated
and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.,
70
Over the years the Court has maintained its insistence on the torture being at the
top of a pyramid of suffering. However, it should be noted that it has manifestly
adjusted downward the line between torture and inhuman treatment. It did this in
Selmouni v. France (1999). 7 1 In that case, the applicant had been subjected to
sustained beatings, leaving medically certified trauma on various parts of the body.
In a series of similar cases, going back to the Northern Ireland case (which
involved more than just the five interrogation techniques), the Court had
considered such treatment as inhuman and degrading, but as not deserving what it
called the "special stigma" attaching to torture.72 This time it announced that it
was changing track. Invoking its doctrine of the Convention being a "living
instrument," the Court said it:
[C]onsiders that certain acts which were classified in the past as
"inhuman and degrading treatment" as opposed to "torture" could be
classified differently in future. It takes the view that the increasingly
high standard being required in the area of the protection of human
rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires
greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of
democratic societies.
73
It has generally been assumed that the Court's language of acknowledging
change in what constitutes torture applies not just to physical brutality, but also to
the mixed physical and psychological pressures involved in the five interrogation
techniques used in Northern Ireland.
Why is this regional case law relevant to our concerns? Because the pyramid
approach is being used to interpret the CAT. CAT Article I defines torture as
follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any
act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
67. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 246 (1978).
68. Id. at para. 96.
69. Id. at para. 167.
70. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), art. 1, para. 2, U.N. Doc.
A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975).
71. See Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16.
72. Id. at 29; Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 59. See also Tomasi v. France, 241 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 22 (1992); Ribitsch v. Austria, 336 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1995).
73. Selmouni, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31.
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act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental
to lawful sanctions.
74
Like the 2002 Interrogation Memorandum, the 2004 Interrogation
Memorandum stresses the distinction the CAT makes between torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.75 It footnotes the definition
contained in the CAT's predecessor, the UN Declaration against Torture, which
defined torture as "an aggravated and deliberate form" of other ill-treatment. 76 Yet
it does not ask why that language about aggravation is missing from the CAT. The
reason that appears from the record is that there was a desire to leave the matter
less certain. This can be inferred from the fact that compromise language was used
in article 16.77 Article 16, it should be recalled, refers to acts of ill-treatment "not
amounting to torture." 78 Those, led assiduously by the United Kingdom (UK),
who wanted to place torture at the top end of pain or suffering, pressed for the
formula: "which are not sufficient to constitute torture." Others, wishing to avoid
the pyramid approach, urged the formula: "which do not constitute torture." The
result was a stand-off, but a stand-off in which the Declaration's reference to
aggravation is missing. This is part of an argument I have developed elsewhere,
proposing that, European Convention practice notwithstanding, the better approach
is that taken by the "Elements of Crime" for war crimes under the ICC Statute (that
is, that the element of purpose be understood as the distinguishing factor).79 None
of this appears in the 2004 Interrogation Memorandum. Nor does it refer to the
watershed Selmouni case.
What is clear is that the pyramid theory was present in documentation before
the Senate when it was deliberating on its advice and consent to ratification of
CAT. So this point may be perceived as relevant to the interpretation of U.S.
legislation giving effect to CAT. And, again, here we may have the nub of the
matter. The issue is what action may the U.S. courts be expected to take vis-A-vis
U.S. personnel involved in interrogation.
This leads to the question of what U.S. courts would consider to be "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." At the time of the deposit of the
U.S. instrument of ratification, the United States stipulated its understanding that
the term would mean "the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment
74. CAT, supra note 50, art. 1(1).
75. 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6.
76. Id. at 6n.14.
77. CAT, supra note 50, art. 16.
78. Id.
79. Nigel S. Rodley, The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law, in 55 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 467, 470, 475 (M.D.A Freeman ed., 2002); Elements of Crime, supra note 20, at art.
8(2)(c)(i)-4.
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prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States." 80  This led the authors of the 2002 Interrogation
Memorandum to assert that torture could not be found if the behavior did not rise
to that level. 81 The DoD Working Group Report followed suit. The point is not
made in the 2004 Interrogation Memorandum. I find it difficult to follow whether
U.S. judicial practice interpreting these constitutional provisions would be
substantially at variance with the practice of international bodies.
It must be acknowledged that the tone of the December 2004 memorandum is
altogether more consistent with mainstream legal discourse on the issue than its
2002 predecessor. Particularly welcome is its explicit rejection of the lurid
threshold of severity for torture expressed by the earlier document, namely, that the
pain would have to be "excruciating and agonizing" or "equivalent in intensity to
the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment
of bodily function, or even death., 82 Also welcome is the re-examination of the
notion of specific intent, especially the affirmation that "[t]here is no exception
under the statute permitting torture to be used for a 'good reason,"' such as with
the motive of protecting national security.83
Nevertheless, we are left with the uncomfortable feeling that the Humpty
Dumpty doctrine of verbal strategy remains operative: "'When I use a word,'
Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to
mean - neither more nor less.' 84 It is, after all, worth noting the statement in the
December 2004 OLC memorandum, according to which "we have reviewed this
Office's prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of detainees and do
not believe that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set
forth in this memorandum."
85
There can be no serious doubt that the prohibition of torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is not only a rule based on treaties,
but also a rule of general or customary international law. While this is not the
place to give extensive justification for this assertion, a few specific elements may
80. U.S. Declarations and Reservations: Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. I, (1) 136 CONG. REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
81. 2002 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 4, at 12-13.
82. 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1-2 (quoting 2002 Interrogation
Memorandum).
83. Id. at 17.
84. Lewis Carroll, Alice Through the Looking Glass (1940 edn., London, Macmillan) 125. As
Professor Paust has it, "moderate coercion to extract information from unwilling human beings and to
create a sense of hopelessness in the minds of detainees is as lawful as moderate rape." Jordan J. Paust,
After 9/11, "No Neutral Ground" with Respect to Human Rights: Executive Claims and Actions of
Special Concern and International Law Regarding the Disappearance of Detainees, 50 WAYNE L.
REv. 79, 81-82 (2004).
85. 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 6, at 2 n.8. Even as he rescinded the list of
approved techniques referred to in the text accompanying note 10 supra, the Secretary of Defense
reinstated some of them, including sleep adjustment, false flag and isolation for up to 30 days or more
and indicated that others could be authorized on an ad hoc basis: Memorandum from Department of
Defense to Commander, U.S. Southern Command, Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on
Terrorism (Apr. 16, 2003), reprinted in DANNER, supra note 1, at 199-204.
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serve to elucidate the issue. First, the fact that all the human rights treaties make
the prohibition non-derogable is telling, as is the fact that torture and cruel or
inhuman treatment are war crimes under international humanitarian law. Second,
the UN General Assembly resolution by which the CAT was adopted spoke of the
desire for "a more effective implementation of the existing prohibition under
international and national law of the practice of torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."86 (emphasis added). Third, states do not
claim a right to engage in activity contemplated by the prohibition; rather, they
deny the facts, or claim that the acts do not fall within the prohibition. Fourth, the
relevant practices are usually unlawful under domestic law. Fifth, national and
international courts have considered the prohibition one of general international
law, if notjus cogens.87 Sixth, the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists
overwhelmingly concurs.88
As far as the prohibition of torture is concerned, it can now safely be said that
the United States' position is unequivocally consistent with this understanding of
the law. The 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, in its first paragraph, affirms that
the prohibition is one of customary international law. Indeed, in a footnote, it cites
cases from the United States and United Kingdom, as well as the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, in support of the suggestion
that the prohibition is one ofjus cogens.
89
The memorandum is silent as to whether the analysis applies also to other
prohibited ill-treatment. Certainly, all the international authorities for the
proposition that torture is prohibited by a rule of international law (possibly jus
cogens) apply pari passu to other prohibited ill-treatment. It is hard to know how
to interpret the silence, because the memorandum does not draw any conclusions
from the acknowledgement of the customary law nature of the prohibition of
torture.
The 2002 Interrogation Memorandum did not refer to customary international
law. However, it will be recalled that the January 22, 2002 memorandum on the
Geneva Conventions did acknowledge the possible customary international law
status of the substance of the Geneva Conventions, but that "[c]ustomary
international law . . . cannot bind the executive branch under the Constitution
86. G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) (emphasis added).
87. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. ICTY IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 144, 153-156 (Dec. 10,
1998); Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3),
[2000] 1 A.C. 137, 198; Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992). A
rule ofjus cogens is a rule of general international law that is considered peremptory and incapable of
being varied even by treaty.
88. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(1987). Id. at 6 n.5.
89. 2004 Interrogation Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1 n.2. In December 2005, the Detainee
Protection Act (the McCain Amendment), section 1403, expressly prohibited all U.S. personnel from
engaging in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as reflected in the U.S. reservations,
declarations and understandings to the CAT. However, it created no new crime or civil cause of action,
but it did provide a new defense to any criminal charge or civil suit (section 1404).
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because it is not federal law." 90 As far as I am aware, this memorandum has not
been withdrawn, and it may reasonably be inferred that the philosophy behind the
statement applies also to the prohibition of torture or other ill-treatment in
international human rights law. Indeed, the April 2003 DoD Working Group
Report, considering both international humanitarian law and international human
rights law, quoted the January 2002 OLC memorandum for both this proposition
and that "any presidential decision in the current conflict concerning the detention
and trial of al-Qaida or Taliban militia prisoners .. .would immediately and
completely override any customary international law." 91
IV. CONCLUSION
As far as concerns obligations under the Geneva Conventions requiring
humane treatment of any detainee and, in particular, avoidance of torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the OLC memoranda have
maintained that certain detainees are not protected by them. In so doing, they have
induced the President of the United States to deny a legal obligation of humane
treatment. Later memoranda, including the controversial August 2002
memorandum, subsequently withdrawn, and the replacement December 2004
memorandum, have not challenged the applicability of the CAT. Rather, the
accent has been on torture as treatment at the apex of prohibited cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, in terms of the pain or suffering inflicted. The
legislation giving effect to the CAT only criminalizes torture (committed abroad),
not other prohibited ill-treatment. Customary international law seems to be
dismissed as unenforceable (at least through the criminal law) in U.S. courts.
In sum, the approach can be summarized by a modified version of the famous
definition of law given by the great American jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: a
prediction of what the American courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, is what we mean by international law.92 Such an approach to
international law does a disservice to the values of the United States and the world
community, just as the practices at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, as found in the
Taguba, Fay and Schlesinger reports, have done to their image.93
As early as two months after the September 11, 2001 atrocity, in my capacity
as UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, I made a valedictory statement to the UN
General Assembly. I there said:
However frustrating may be the search for those behind the
abominable acts of terrorism and for evidence that would bring them to
90. Bybee Memorandum, supra note 25, at 32.
91. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 5, at 6.
92. In The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897), reprinted in THE PATH OF THE
LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 336 (Steven J. Burton ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2000), he states, "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
93. See reports cited supra note 9. In the words of the SCHLESINGER REPORT, "The damage these
incidents have done to U.S. policy, to the image of the U.S. among populations whose support we need
in the Global War on Terror and to the morale of our armed forces, must not be repeated."
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 9, at 18-19.
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justice, I am convinced that any temptation to resort to torture or similar
ill-treatment or to send suspects to countries where they would face such
treatment must be firmly resisted. Not only would that be a violation of
an absolute and peremptory rule of international law, it would be also
responding to a crime against humanity with a further crime under
international law. Moreover, it would be signaling to the terrorists that
the values espoused by the international community are hollow and no
more valid than the travesties of principle defended by the terrorists. 
94
That lawyers at the highest level of U.S. officialdom were already about to
provide opinions contemplating precisely what I was warning against is a
challenge to the world community's most deeply held legal values. It can only be
hoped that serious efforts will be made to try to put the genie back in the bottle.
Measures the United States could take to help restore its traditional reputation for
adherence to the legal principle that every person in the hands of a state or any
party to an armed conflict is entitled to humane treatment and, in particular, not to
be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
within the meaning of general international law would include: replacing the 2002
Presidential directive with a new one that accepts the legal right of everyone not to
be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
amending the law to ensure that all war crimes under international law involving
torture or cruel, inhuman or other inhumane treatment are war crimes under U.S.
law; ensuring that all agencies of the U.S. government are subject to that law;
ensuring that they obey it; and, producing any remaining 'ghost detainees' to the
ICRC, giving them substantial compensation and never again resorting to the
practices that created them.
94. The Special Rapporteur, Statement by the Special Rapporteur, 14, delivered to the Third
Committee of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4./2002/76 (Nov. 8, 2000).
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